The involvement of developing countries in international clinical trials is necessary for the development of appropriate medicines for local populations. However, the absence of appropriate structures for ethical review represents a barrier for certain countries. Currently there is very little information available on existing structures dedicated to ethics in western and central Africa. This article briefly describes historical milestones in the development of networks dedicated to capacity building in ethical review in these regions and outlines the major conclusions of two (...) workshops on this issue, which were held in September and October 2002 in Libreville, Gabon, and Paris, France. The workshops were the culmination of collaboration between the African Malaria Network Trust (AMANET) and the Pan African Bioethics Initiative (PABIN). They produced an update on ethics organizations with regard to mission, function, activities, members, and contact people, in eight countries within the regions discussed. As a result of the commitment of mandated delegates, a further prominent outcome followed these workshops: the creation of national structures, where none existed before, dedicated to the ethical review of clinical trials. (shrink)

The involvement of developing countries in international clinical trials is necessary for the development of appropriate medicines fo.

This paper does not present an advocacy of a passive education as opposed to an active education nor does it propose that passive education is in any way ‘better’ or more important than active education. Through readings of Maurice Blanchot, Jacques Derrida and B.S. Johnson, and gentle critiques of Jacques Rancière and John Dewey, passive education is instead described and outlined as an education which occurs whether we attempt it or not. As such, the object of critique for (...) this essay are forms of educational thought which, through fate or design, exclude the passive dimension, either within or outside of formal educational settings. An underlying component of this argument is therefore also that education does occur outside of formal educational settings and that, contra Gert Biesta and his critique of ‘learnification’, we may gain rather than lose something by attending to it as education. (shrink)

This paper asks the question of how we can situate the educational subject in what Luciano Floridi has defined as an ‘informational ontology’. It will suggest that Jacques Derrida and Bernard Stiegler offer paths toward rethinking the educational subject that lend themselves to an informational future, as well as speculating on how, with this knowledge, we can educate to best equip ourselves and others for our increasingly digital world. Jacques Derrida thought the concept of the subject was ‘indispensable’ (...) as a function but did not subscribe to or accept any particular theory of how a subject could be defined or developed because it was always situated in and as a context. Following Derrida, Bernard Stiegler explains in Technics and Time: 1 that ‘the relation binding the “who” and the “what” is invention’. As such, the separation between self and world can be seen as artificial, including if this world is perceived wholly or partly as technological, digital or informational. If this is the case, a responsibility is placed on the educator and their part in ‘inventing’ this distinction for future generations. How this invention of the educational subject is negotiated is therefore one the many philosophical tasks for digital pedagogy. (shrink)

Through readings of Jacques Derrida's Of Grammatology and 'The Age of Hegel', attention is given to two of the problematic types of relationships that philosophy can have with education. These engagements, alongside a reading of 'The Antinomies of the Philosophical Discipline: Letter Preface', show how Derrida’s thought can prescribe no educational programme and instead troubles educational proclamations and certainties. Throughout his life, Derrida negotiated his relationships to the educational systems and institutions to which he was responsible, these negotiations, though, (...) were not indicative of a belief in any ontologically grounded educational truth. Quite to the contrary, as I will claim, Derrida’s thought is remarkable for its deflation of the myth, stretching at least as far back to Plato’s Republic, that philosophy can discover and prescribe the practical means for its own educational good. The argument presented in this article is that Derrida’s thought is particularly fertile when it comes to educational reflection precisely because it does not close down, presuppose, or prescribe, and that these characteristics also allow for generative contradictions in Derrida's educational and philosophical thought and practice. (shrink)

This paper is an attempt to sketch out the conceptual possibility of what is given the name remuant existence. That is to say, a changeable, restless and fickle existence. The word remuant, no longer in common use in the English language, is an adjective. Its meaning offered here is used to designate what will be considered the qualifying attribute of existence, which is to make the point that existence is remuant existence. Existence is a common noun and thereby grammatically a (...) universal but if it cannot exist without being remuant its nominal universality is of no significance. The universality of existence does not mean anything; only remuant existence has meaning. The articulation of this concept, and those which are concomitant with it, is primarily an untangling of the remuant from the critique of presence and of the subject offered by Jacques Derrida, whose influence remains visitant throughout. (shrink)

The opposition between constraint and free necessity leads Spinoza's commentators to conceive of ethical liberation as a reconciliation with one's self against alienations due to external causes, and to confuse constraint with contrariety. Analysis of the word coactus in Spinoza's works shows that finite modes can't exist and can't free themselves without constraints, which are not always a source of contrariety. Such an analysis is close to those of Émile Durkheim and Pierre Bourdieu.

Discourse on the origin and foundations of inequality among men (complete) -- On the social contract (complete) -- Emile, or, On education -- Julie, or, The new Heloise -- Reveries of the solitary walker.

Le jeune philosophe viennois Otto Weininger se suicide en octobre 1903, âgé de 23 ans. Il vient de faire paraître un brûlot, Sexe et Caractère, qui restera un succès de librairie pendant deux décennies, avec 36 rééditions jusqu'en 1925. Sigmund Freud le considérera comme un génie. Ludwig Wittgenstein le tiendra en grande estime, tout comme Karl Kraus, Stephan Zweig, Robert Musil, James Joyce, Franz Kafka, Georges Bataille ou encore Emil Cioran. Malgré tous les hommages qu'il a reçus, Weininger est quasiment (...) inconnu en France. Est-il si difficile d'aborder et de comprendre le foisonnement intellectuel et artistique qu'a connu Vienne avant l'effondrement de l'empire austro-hongrois?? Le caractère antisémite et antiféministe de son œuvre le rend-il toujours aussi infréquentable?? Certes, la brièveté de son existence et la radicalité de ses positions ne plaident pas pour une approche nuancée du personnage. En fait, la renommée d'Otto Weininger, ici resituée dans son contexte, a été occultée par l'aura internationale que Freud a eu le temps de construire jusqu'en 1939. Pourtant, à son grand étonnement, jusqu'au seuil de la mort, certains de ses visiteurs lui poseront des questions sur les relations directes ou indirectes qu'il a eues avec cette étoile filante de la nuit viennoise. Tous deux se sont attaqués aux mêmes questions dans une période marquée par de profonds bouleversements. C'est ce qui explique que la bisexualité, la femme et l'homme face à leurs rôles respectifs et, plus généralement encore, les multiples éléments qui constituent l'identité de chacun sont des sujets qui résonnent toujours dans notre actualité. (shrink)

Rousseau tries to show that civic patriotism is compatible with genuine moral cosmopolitanism as well as republican cosmopolitanism (the compatibility thesis). I try to clarify these concepts, and distinguish them from other types of cosmopolitanism, such as moral, cultural, economic, and epistemological cosmopolitanisms. Rousseau winds up with a form of rooted cosmopolitanism that tries to strike a balance between republican patriotism and republican as well as thin moral cosmopolitanism, offering a synthesis through education. A careful reading of Émile shows (...) that this is a book about the formation of a moral and cognitive cosmopolitan who avoids the deformations of a commercial society influenced by processes of globalisation. (shrink)

The German–American physiologist Jacques Loeb (1859–1924) and the Polish embryologist Emil Godlewski, jr. (1875–1944) contributed many valuable works to the body of developmental biology. Jacques Loeb was world famous at the beginning of the twentieth century for his development and demonstration of artificial parthenogenesis in 1899 and his experiments on regeneration. He served as a role model for the younger Polish experimenter Emil Godlewski, who began his career as a researcher like Loeb at the Zoological Station in Naples. (...) Following Godlewski’s first visit to Naples in 1901 a close relationship between the two scientists developed. Until Loeb’s death in 1924 the two exchanged ideas via correspondence that was only interrupted during the First World War. The aim of the paper is to examine the transatlantic transfer of knowledge in the field of biological experimentation that was fostered by these two protagonists. Using a modification of Bruno Latour’s model of the ‘Circulatory System of Science’ as a heuristic tool, different mechanisms of scientific exchange are displayed. With the help of Loeb’s and Godlewski’s correspondence the role of scientific communities, methods, allies, the public and institutions in the process of knowledge transfer are analysed. Preconditions for success and failure in transferring science are examined. (shrink)

This article considers the ways in which a series of artworks by French artist Jean-Baptiste Greuze focus on the father’s ethical education of his male children, reading these as a close visualization of the pedagogical theories of Rousseau. Through paintings that contemplate family life, religious sentiment, filial piety, obedience versus disobedience, illness, and death, Greuze’s images of male youth coalesce with the ethics promoted in Rousseau’s novel Emile—stressing in particular the compassion and good conscience that a boy should develop under (...) the guidance of his father to become a man of virtue. In so doing, the artist responds to some of the key historic issues and social beliefs affecting male youth during his era: the necessity of apprenticed boys to leave home; an idealization of country living and farming as the best occupation for the adult male; and an overwhelming concern, widespread during this heightened period of warfare and unrest preceding the French Revolution, that young men go astray when they become soldiers. (shrink)

This article considers the ways in which a series of artworks by French artist Jean-Baptiste Greuze focus on the father’s ethical education of his male children, reading these as a close visualization of the pedagogical theories of Rousseau. Through paintings that contemplate family life, religious sentiment, filial piety, obedience versus disobedience, illness, and death, Greuze’s images of male youth coalesce with the ethics promoted in Rousseau’s novel Emile—stressing in particular the compassion and good conscience that a boy should develop under (...) the guidance of his father to become a man of virtue. In so doing, the artist responds to some of the key historic issues and social beliefs affecting male youth during his era: the necessity of apprenticed boys to leave home; an idealization of country living and farming as the best occupation for the adult male; and an overwhelming concern, widespread during this heightened period of warfare and unrest preceding the French Revolution, that young men go astray when they become soldiers. (shrink)

One of the most legendary educational books ever written is Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s “Émile ou de l’Education”. Most obviously Rousseau wrote this book guided by diverse more or less conscious purposes and one of the main problems it presents is paradoxical: Does education have to promote freedom by force? In this article I will, firstly, present several aims that might have triggered Rousseau to write “Émile”. Secondly, I will discuss Rousseau’s view of the so called “educational paradox”. Since (...) this quandary touches the topic of many other of his books, I will discuss “Émile” along with Rousseau’s other works and thus place his educational story in his “great narrative”. (shrink)

Over the past decades, science education researchers have suggested Inquiry-Based Science Education (IBSE) teaching interventions for science classes. In this article, we argue that IBSE’s basic principles can be traced back to Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s work Emile or On Education (1762). First, we will look at IBSE’s rationale. Then we will turn to Emile and outline Rousseau’s educational ideas concerning science education. We will show that Rousseau’s suggested practices for science education are very similar to those of IBSE. Yet despite (...) their vivid similarities, Rousseau seems to pursue epistemic virtues, whilst IBSE aims at epistemic skills. However, nurturing epistemic skills might be seen as the first step for cultivating an epistemically virtuous character. So, embracing Rousseau’s ideal for full character development could further inspire IBSE’s proposals. (shrink)

It is often said that the claims of man and citizen are irreconcilable in the philosophy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. This view, most famously articulated by Judith Shklar, holds that the making of a man and the making of a citizen are to be understood as rival enterprises or competing alternatives. This reading has recently been challenged by Frederick Neuhouser. He argues that one can make a man and a citizen, but only if the education of each is performed in (...) the absence of the other. In his view, Emile is raised to be a man first before his subsequent instruction in citizenship. This paper challenges both views. I argue that the making of man and citizen are, in principle, neither rival enterprises nor competing alternatives, and that although Neuhouser is indeed correct to argue for a successive system of education, the making of a citizen is not completed in Emile, but extends into the Social Contract. His account diminishes the crucial role the Lawgiver plays in the fashioning of citizens capable of discerning the general will. I show that although raising individuals under a system of private instruction does not preclude their transformation into citizens but makes such a transformation possible, it is on its own incapable of making citizens. (shrink)

The aim of this contribution is to critically explore the understanding, the goals and the meaning of education in the philosophy of education by Jean-Jacques Rousseau. In his educational novel Emile: or On Education [Emile ou De l’éducation] (1762) he depicts his account of the natural education. Rousseau argues that all humans share one and the same development process which is independent of their social background. He regards education as an active process of perfection which is curiosity-driven and intrinsic (...) to each child. Rousseau’s educational goals are autarky, happiness and freedom. (shrink)

This paper examines how philosophy of education textbooks present Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s views on women and socialization. It reviews ten texts, involving nine authors, and finds that they generally focus on the concepts of Nature, Negative Education, and Child Development from Books I-III of Emile, but severely restrict mentioning its Book V and The Social Contract. While these results implicitly reflect Rousseau’s historical influence on “progressive” educators, they do not seriously attend to well-established critiques of Rousseau’s sexism and omit acknowledging (...) his intent that Emile’s Negative Education in Nature leads toward his socialization in the General Will. (shrink)

Traditionally Rousseau has been interpreted as an advocate of modern nationalism and nationalist education. This article tries to show that Rousseau defended a form of civic patriotism, which is in principle compatible with genuine moral as well as republican cosmopolitanism. While Rousseau attacked several forms of cosmopolitanism espoused at his time, such as commercial or natural law cosmo politanism, he himself developed a kind of »rooted cosmopolitanism« which tried to strike a balance between republican patriotism and legitimate forms of cosmopolitanism. (...) A careful reading of Émile shows that this is a book about the formation of a moral and cognitive cosmopolitan who avoids the deformations of commercial society. (shrink)

This article explores a perplexing line from Rousseau's Emile: his suggestion that the ‘most important rule’ for the educator is ‘not to gain time but to lose it’. An analysis of what Rousseau meant by this line, the article argues, shows that Rousseau provides the philosophical groundwork for a radical critique of the contemporary cultural framework that supports homework, standardised testing, and the competitive extracurricular activities that consume children's time. He offers important insights to contemporary parents and educators wishing to (...) reimagine an educational system that is currently fuelled more by familial and international amour propre than by children's interests and needs. Not the least of these is his recognition that to reimagine children's education would require a new configuration of the very terms of modern life. Problematically, however, Rousseau's alternative to mechanised clock-time depends on the labour of Sophie, whose time is also reconfigured. For the next generation of children to be educated according to natural time, Sophie's labour needs to be off the clock too, which is just as much a linchpin of her removal from the public sphere of citizenship and the paid workforce as it is of Emile's education for public life, or so the final section of this paper argues. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:258 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY and diversity"-- ("it is useless to deny or even minimize the incongruities and the contradictions" in Rousseau's statements, as Burgelin says in another book). Instead he puts the finger on the one trait that sets this piece of rationalism (or anti-rationalism, as some would say) apart from all others: not sentiment verging on the mystical, but egocentrism, existentially founded and unique. Rousseau, taking a stand (...) outside the battling parties, outside his own religion, becomes more and more "une existence solitaire en face d'une autre existence, qui le regarde," that "other existence" which he calls God. Alas, the descent from such existential heights is swift. Soon the solitary thinker will be enmeshed again in unsolitary speculations about those very issues he had left behind in his flight into the self. Where will this strange pilgrim's progress end? In 1769, seven years before his death and feeling the cold breath of old age upon him, Jean-Jacques wrote: "In my childhood I believed by authority, in my youth by feeling, in my mature age by reason; now I believe because I have always believed." Burgelin cites this as proof that Rousseau never ceased to believe. Maybe so. But is this the point? What the passage defines is the pilgrim's irreversible religious itinerary. On cannot but ask what the next inevitable stop on the road would have been. Waiting for Godot? "Whoever makes an effort to find in Rousseau's work an explicit philosophy... runs into a very peculiar difficulty, for a philosophy is defined above all by its coherence, and [Rousseau] himself warns us against his own methods." With these words Pierre Burgelin opened his monumental work, La philosophic de l'existence de ].-]. Rousseau (1952). It is in the several pertinent chapters of this earlier work that the reader will find what the present book withholds: a philosophical analysis as rigorous as it is profound and comprehensive, the best analysis we have to Rousseau's religious thought. Professor Burgelin's new book merely proves that not even he can do justice to Jean-Jacques without explaining him. GREGORSEBBA Emory University l~mile ou de l'dducation. Par Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Introduction, bibliographic, notes, et index analytique par Francois et Pierre Richard. gdition illustr~e. (Paris: ~ditions Garnier Fr~res, 1962. Pp. 1 + 664 [1].) While the new Pldiade edition of Rousseau, a model of contemporary French scholarship, makes its slow, stately way towards completion, the well-known yellow Classiques Garnier keep coming out in new editions or simply in new dress. This 12mile is a handsomely produced, very readable BOOK REVIEWS 259 reissue of the 1939 Garnier edition, with reproductions of eighteenthcentury engravings on themes of Rousseau. They add rich period flavor to this strange work in which a hypermodern intelligence talks the language of three centuries ago. There are useful notes, the detailed subject index is exceptionally well laid out, the spacious bibliography is ample for Rousseau 's sources and influence, but its meager twentieth-century section should have been reworked and brought up to date. The Introduction, too, can still be read with much profit, even though its critical standpoint is now antiquated, eloquent proof of the effectiveness of Rousseau scholarship in the last two decades. For its price this is a very handy, serviceable edition to have until the Biblioth~que de la PMiade catches up with Garnier Fr~res. Emory University GREGOR SEBBA Kant's Theory o[ Knowledge. By Graham Bird. (New York: The Humanities Press, 1962. Pp. x + 210. ~5.50.) In the Preface the author states that he has two main objectives in his book: To pursue one central argument through the Critique of Pure Reason and to discuss Kant's views in terms of a modern philosophical idiom. Bird follows this programme out through most of the book, departing from it on only one occasion, in Chapter 11 (pp. 181-188) in which he discusses and criticizes Strawson's theory of personality (as presented in his book Individuals, chap. 3). The space given to Strawson does not, however, constitute a serious digression from the main argument because it comes at the end of a chapter devoted... (shrink)

L’Émile met en scène deux leçons de choses visant à initier l’élève à la science économique : l’une concernant le fondement du droit de propriété, l’autre concernant l’échange marchand et la division sociale du travail. Ces deux moments éducatifs donnent un précieux éclairage sur la pensée économique de Rousseau, pensée plus complexe et informée qu’on ne le considère communément. Mais c’est également dans les décisions existentielles d’émile que sont abordées philosophiquement les conditions d’un choix rationnel, la maximisation de (...) la satisfaction et les vertus supposées de la concurrence. Par ces différents biais, Rousseau met à l’épreuve et critique les thèses de la science économique, annonciatrices du libéralisme, qui s’ébauchent à son époque.Two practical lessons, in Émile, aim to introduce the pupil to economics. The first one concerns the foundation of the right to property ; the second one concerns trade and the social division of work. Both of these educational moments show Rousseau’s economic thought to be more complex and informed than we often believe. But Émile’s existential decisions are also occasions for philosophical investigations on the conditions of rational choice, the maximization of satisfaction and the supposed benefits of competition between bids. Through these differents issues, Rousseau puts to the test and critically examines the free market principles which are starting to take shape just then. (shrink)

s political theory apparently leads us to choose between patriotism and cosmopolitism. The two major works published in 1762, On the Social Contract and Emile , would represent the two sides of the alternative. However, the opposition between patriotism and cosmopolitism is the ultimate development of an internal tension between two aspects of Rousseau’s political concept of people: the intersubjectivity that permits the formation of the general will; and the individual’s devotion to the state. On the one hand, the political (...) community appears as a distributive totality. On the other hand, it is viewed as a collective totality. When generalized, intersubjectivity leads to the formation of both the social concept of people and the moral concept of humanity, while patriotism requires the individual’s loyalty to the nation. In order to maintain the coherence of the very political concept of people and to solve the main political problem - which is to reconcile security and liberty - it is necessary to overcome the dichotomy between cosmopolitism and patriotism. Emile and Rousseau’s original plan for On the Social Contract are consistent on that point. Key Words: cosmopolitism • general will • intersubjectivity • nation • patriotism • people. (shrink)

" Faites mieux : soyez raisonnable, et ne raisonnez point avec votre élève, surtout pour lui faire approuver ce qui lui déplaît ; car amener ainsi toujours la raison dans les choses désagréables, ce n'est que la lui rendre ennuyeuse, et la décréditer de bonne heure dans un esprit qui n'est pas encore en état de l'entendre. Exercez son corps, ses organes, ses sens, ses forces, mais tenez son âme oisive aussi longtemps qu'il se pourra. " Rousseau, Emile.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Jean-Jacques Rousseau: A Friend of VirtueMatthew SimpsonJoseph R. Reisert. Jean-Jacques Rousseau: A Friend of Virtue. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003. Pp. xiv + 211. Cloth, $42.50.This important book is an interpretation and defense of Rousseau's theory of moral education, in which the author explains and justifies Rousseau's ideas about what virtue is, why it is important, and how it can be cultivated.Briefly, this is his (...) reading: in advanced societies, people come to possess intense and incoherent passions, enflamed by amour-propre, which set them at odds with themselves and with each other, making bourgeois existence unsatisfying and exploitive. To create a better life, people must learn to restrain their desires in a way that promotes their own happiness; they must be taught virtue, which Reisert defines as, "the strength of character to rule over one's passions, so that one can make oneself do what one knows one ought to do" (8). Finally, the best model for the moral educator is not ruler to ruled, but friend to friend.The book is both a defense of this interpretation of Rousseau, and a defense of Rousseau's social and psychological theory itself, most notably against Aristotle, Locke, and Buffon. While the two lines of argument do not go together seamlessly, Reisert offers a number of contributions to Rousseau scholarship and to social thought, especially as it intersects with liberal political theory. He divides the work into two parts. The first explains Rousseau's theory of human nature and his diagnosis of the ills of society. The second interprets and defends his ideas about how to remedy that condition through the cultivation of virtue by means of friendship. The final chapter discusses the importance of virtue for contemporary liberal politics.The first half of the book, on Rousseau's "physics of the soul," touches on self-love, pity, vanity, and conscience. For some reason, Reisert limits his discussion largely to the meaning of amour-propre in the second Discourse and Emile to the exclusion of other issues and other books. Even so, he gives an interesting interpretation of amour-propre, and how it leads to the restless, banal misery that both authors think is characteristic of modern life.The problems of this section come when Reisert attempts to defend Rousseau. He argues that his theory of human nature is to be preferred because it answers questions that others cannot, such as how essentially asocial beings have come to live in societies. Yet, this question and some others he discusses come into being only because of Rousseau's own assumptions, for example that people are asocial in the first place. So, Rousseau's ability to solve puzzles that exist only on the basis of his own principles cannot be taken as evidence for those principles without begging the question.The second half of the work is more innovative. Reisert makes two basic arguments: that only virtue can alleviate the dissatisfactions of bourgeois existence; and that only the relationship of friendship can bring about this "education to virtue" (141). The first is less controversial given that he defines virtue simply as the power to restrain irrational desires for the sake of happiness; yet he goes on to make an interesting distinction between the virtue of Socrates who does not have irrational desires to begin with, and that of Emile who has them but can control them.The most original part of the book is his argument that only the relationship of friendship can foster virtue. He says that the amour-propre which makes people miserable also makes them resistant to efforts to improve their character. "A friend," on the other hand, "can, through force of personality and the power of example, exert a potent influence on his friend without thereby provoking resistance or inspiring resentment" (171). He gives a fascinating account of how a friend can be a kind of better self through whose eyes one sees the source of one's own dissatisfaction and the need for virtue to make life enjoyable. His most path breaking suggestion is that in his writings, especially Emile, Rousseau intended to be such a friend to... (shrink)

Scholarly accounts of the training of pity in Jean-Jacques Rousseau's Emile focus on how Emile's tutor activates the psychological mechanisms necessary for the feeling of pity in book 4 of the text. This account is inadequate, for it fails to show how Emile acquires the evaluative ability to make the judgment about who deserves pity as well as the willingness to adjudicate his own and others' interests. In this article, Wing Sze Leung argues that books 1 through 3 lay (...) the foundation by developing in Emile the attitudes and dispositions that guide him in his judgment-making about which kind of life he should pursue. Books 4 and 5 then develop Emile's ability to make interpersonal judgments of pity through habituated practice. By gradually cultivating Emile's sensitivity to the potential conflict between his self-interests and others' well-being, as well as the resolution to refrain from infringing on others' interests and to pursue the common good, Rousseau's long-term educational project molds Emile's disposition to act as justice demands. The article concludes with a brief response to some criticisms about Rousseau's educational project. (shrink)